

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 SANTO 01722 01 OF 04 191707 Z

45

ACTION ARA-17

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-09 H-02 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-15 USIA-12

ACDA-19 AID-20 IO-12 NIC-01 EUR-25 OMB-01 EB-11

TRSE-00 RSR-01 /174 W

----- 115038

R 191410 Z APR 73

FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7937

INFO CINCSO FOR POLAD

CINCLANT FOR POLAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 SANTO DOMINGO 1722

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINS, DR

SUBJECT: DOMINICAN POLITICAL ASSESSMENT: FIRST QUARTER 1973:

THE AFTERMATH OF THE PLAYA CARACOLES GUERRILLA LANDING

REF: SD 0216

1. SUMMARY: WITH THE VIRTUAL ELIMINATION OF THE GUERRILLA BAND, WHICH INVADED THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IN FEBRUARY, THE GODR IS EXPECTED TO RELAX ITS SECURITY MEASURES AND REDUCE ITS PRESSURE ON THE FAR LEFT AND PRD OPPOSITION. BY MOVING QUICKLY AT THE OUTSET OF THE GUERRILLA INCURSION, THE GODR WAS ABLE TO FORESTALL ANY POSSIBLE CIVIL DISTURBANCE WHICH COULD HAVE ACCOMPANIED THE LANDING. THE GOVERNMENT' S TASK IN MAINTAINING ORDER WAS FACILITATED BY THE PROLONGED PERIOD OF ECONOMIC PROSPERITY AND RELATIVE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL TRANQUILITY WHICH PRECEDED THE REBEL LANDING. IN THE WAKE OF ITS SUCCESS, THE GOVERNMENT SEEMS STRONGER AND MORE UNITED THAN EVER WHILE THE OPPOSITION ( PARTICULARLY THE FAR LEFT AND THE PRD), BADLY SHAKEN BY RECENT EVENTS, CONTINUES UNSUCCESSFULLY TO PURSUE ITS ELUSIVE GOAL OF UNITY. PERHAPS TO PLACATE THE POLITICAL RIGHT, PRESIDENT BALAGUER, IN HIS INDEPENDENCE DAY SPEECH, REAFFIRMED THE GODR' S CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND FOREIGN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SANTO 01722 01 OF 04 191707 Z

INVESTMENT, ALLAYING APPREHENSIONS OF CONSERVATIVE SECTORS FEARFUL THAT THE REGIME WOULD CONTINUE ITS " DRIFT TO THE LEFT." THE TREND TOWARD RELAXATION WAS MOMENTARILY HALTED, HOWEVER, BY THE MARCH 28 SLAYING OF A PROMINENT DOMINICAN JOURNALIST WHICH SENT TENSIONS SOARING AGAIN. APPARENT OFFICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE MURDER HAS PROVEN TO BE AN EMBARRASSMENT TO THE GODR AND SPARKED A POWER PLAY BETWEEN THE REGIME' S TWO MOST POWERFUL GENERALS. THE CURRENT ATMOSPHERE IS ONE OF WATCHFUL WAITING AS THE GODR CONTEMPLATES ITS NEXT STEP VIS- A- VIS THE PRD AND ITS EXPLOITATION OF HAMLET HERMANN, A GUERRILLA CAPTURED ON MARCH 25. END SUMMARY.

2. THE FEBRUARY 2 LANDING OF NINE DOMINICAN GUERRILLAS AT PLAYA CARACOL ELECTRIFIED THE NATION AND TEMPORARILY ENDED A PRO- LONGED PERIOD OF RELATIVE POLITICAL TRANQUILITY IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. THE GOVERNMENT, CAUGHT OFF- GUARD AND APPARENTLY DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF URBAN SUPPORT FOR THE INSURGENT LANDING, REACTED SWIFTLY AND DECISIVELY TO ASSERT ITS AUTHORITY AND MAINTAIN PEACE AND ORDER THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, PARTICULARLY IN THE CAPITAL AND LARGER INTERIOR CITIES. PRESUMABLY PERCEIVING THE MOST IMMINENT THREAT FROM THE EXTREME LEFT AND FROM THE DOMINICAN REVOLUTIONARY PARTY ( PRD), THE GODR MOVED QUICKLY TO NEUTRALIZE BOTH GROUPS AT THE OUTSET WHILE AT THE SAME TIME MOUNTING A MASSIVE EFFORT TO FIND AND DESTROY THE GUERRILLA FORCE IN THE MOUNTAINOUS AREA NEAR SAN JOSE DE OCOA. GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS IN THIS REGARDS, ALTHOUGH OFTEN HAMPERED BY INCLEMENT WEATHER, INHOSPITABLE TERRAIN, POOR LOGISTICS AND COMMUNICATIONS, AND INEPT MILITARY LEADERSHIP, ULTIMATELY RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF GUERRILLA LEADER FRANCISCO CAAMANO DENO AND TWO OTHER REBELS ON FEBRUARY 16 ( SD-0714), THE DEATH DUE TO EXPOSURE OF ANOTHER GUERRILLA IN LATE FEBRUARY OR EARLY MARCH, THE DEATHS OF TWO MORE GUERRILLAS ON MARCH 23, AND FINALLY THE CAPTURE ON MARCH 25 OF HAMLET HERMANN PEREZ ( SD-1357). ONE GUERRILLA, CLAUDIO CAAMANO GRULLON, ( A NEPHEW OF CAAMANO DENO) SUCCESSFULLY MADE HIS WAY TO THE CAPITAL AND TOOK REFUGE IN THE MEXICAN EMBASSY ON APRIL 17. ONLY ONE OF THE ORIGINAL NINE GUERRILLAS REMAINS AT LARGE, PRESUMABLY IN THE CAPITAL. ALTHOUGH A PLATOON SIZE UNIT, NOW WITHDRAWN, REMAINED FOR A TIME IN THE VILLA ALTAGRACIA AREA TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE PEASANTS, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER THE GUERRILLA THREAT HAS BEEN ELIMINATED AND THE GODR HAS BEGUN TO TAKE TENTATIVE STEPS TO RESTORE THE COUNTRY TO NORMALCY. NONETHELESS, THE GUERRILLA OPERATION HAS HAD IMPORTANT AND PROFOUND EFFECTS AND MAY PROVE IN RETROSPECT TO BE A MAJOR CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 SANTO 01722 01 OF 04 191707 Z

WATERSHED IN RECENT DOMINICAN POLITICAL HISTORY. ALTHOUGH IT IS

PREMATURE TO TRY TO GAUGE THE FULL SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE EFFECTS  
AT THIS STAGE, SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS CAN BE MADE.

3. GODR: IT APPEARS THE GOVERNMENT RESPONDED TO THE EXTERNAL  
THREAT BY SUBMERGING, TEMPORARILY AT LEAST, INTERNECINE SQUABBLES  
AND DEMONSTRATING OFFICIAL SOLIDARITY BEFORE THE COMMON ENEMY.  
FOR EXAMPLE, MOUNTING EVIDENCE OF RESISTANCE TO BALAGUER'S LAND  
REFORM PROGRAM FROM CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT  
SEEMS TO HAVE VANISHED, ON THE SURFACE AT LEAST, AS A RESULT OF  
THE INVASION. MOREOVER, PUBLIC DEBATE, OFTEN ACRIMONIOUS,  
AMONG VARIOUS FEUDING PRO- BALAGUER FACTIONS WITHIN THE GODR  
SUCH AS THE REFORMIST AGRARIAN MOVEMENT ( MAR), THE NATIONAL  
YOUTH MOVEMENT ( MNJ), AND THE REFORMIST PARTY, DECLINED SHARPLY  
WITH THE NEWS OF THE GUERRILLA LANDING. SIMILARLY, CONFLICTS  
AMONG VARIOUS KEY MILITARY OFFICIERS WERE DOWNPLAYED DURING THE  
GUERRILLA OPERATION, AN INDICATION OF THE HEIGHTENED LEVEL OF  
CONCERN WITH WHICH THEY APPARENTLY VIEWED THE THREAT. AS DIVERSE  
AND OFTEN COMPETING ELEMENTS WITHIN THE GODR RALLIED TOGETHER  
TO DEFEND THEIR COMMON INTERESTS AGAINST THE INTRUDERS, THE  
BALAGUER REGIME AGAIN DEMONSTRATED THAT BY FLEXING ITS MUSCLES  
AND LAYING ASIDE VARIOUS LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL NICETIES, IT  
COULD EFFECTIVELY MAINTAIN PUBLIC ORDER AND PEACE. DESPITE

CONFIDENTIAL

ADP000

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 SANTO 01722 02 OF 04 191632 Z

45

ACTION ARA-17

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-09 H-02 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-15 USIA-12

ACDA-19 AID-20 IO-12 NIC-01 EUR-25 OMB-01 EB-11

TRSE-00 RSR-01 /174 W

----- 114749

R 191410 Z APR 73

FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7938

INFO CINCSO FOR POLAD

CINCLANT FOR POLAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 SANTO DOMINGO 1722

INDIGNANT PROTESTS FROM SECTORS OUTRAGED BY THE HIGH- HANDED

OFFICIAL ACTION AGAINST THE EXTREME LEFT, THE PRD, THE AUTONOMOUS UNIVERSITY, AND THE MEDIA, POPULAR REACTION AGAINST THE WAVE OF REPRESSIVE MEASURES, ALTHOUGH BROAD IN SCOPE, WAS LARGELY VERBAL IN NATURE AND THUS INEFFECTUAL. THAT THE GODR WAS ABLE TO TAKE SUCH STRINGENT MEASURES WITHOUT SPARKING A VIOLENT POPULAR REACTION OR, IN FACT, ENGENDERING ANY SIGNIFICANT RISE IN THE LEVEL OF PUBLIC VIOLENCE MUST BE A SUBJECT OF SERIOUS CONTEMPLATION BOTH WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND AMONG THE OPPOSITION. A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR CONTRIBUTING TO THE GODR'S SUCCESS IN THIS REGARD WAS THE POOR TIMING OF THE GUERRILLA OPERATION, COMING AT A POINT IN DOMINICAN HISTORY WHEN THE COUNTRY WAS EXPERIENCING AN UNPRECEDENTED WAVE OF ECONOMIC PROSPERITY AND SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PEACE.

4. IT ALSO SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE POWERFUL AND INFLUENTIAL BUSINESS COMMUNITY, AS WELL AS THE BURGEONING MIDDLE CLASS, WERE SHAKEN BY THE NEWS OF THE GUERRILLA LANDING, VIEWING IT AS A DIRECT THREAT TO THEIR CONTINUED WELL-BEING. OPPOSITION TO THE GODR FROM THESE SECTORS DURING THE INCURSION WAS NOTABLY MUTED, INDICATING THAT THE BUSINESS SECTOR UNDERSTANDABLY PREFERRED THE STABILITY PROVIDED BY THE BALAGUER GOVERNMENT TO THE UNCERTAINTIES WHICH A REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE FROM THE LEFT WOULD BRING. IN A TIME  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SANTO 01722 02 OF 04 191632 Z

OF CRISIS, BALAGUER MUST HAVE BEEN CONTENT TO WITNESS THE CONTINUED SUPPORT, HOWEVER UNENTHUSIASTIC, FROM THESE POLITICALLY IMPORTANT SECTORS. IN A PROBABLE MOVE TO REINFORCE THIS TACIT BACKING BY VESTED ECONOMIC INTERESTS, PARTICULARLY DURING THE GUERRILLA OPERATION, BALAGUER'S FEBRUARY 27 INDEPENDENCE DAY SPEECH, CONTRARY TO EXPECTATIONS FROM SOME QUARTERS, REASSURED THE POLITICAL RIGHT THAT THE GODR REMAINED FIRMLY COMMITTED TO PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT. HIS SPEECH WAS GREETED WITH AUDIBLE SIGHS OF RELIEF FROM CONSERVATIVE GROUPS FEARFUL THAT THE PRESIDENT MIGHT CONTINUE HIS "DRIFT TO THE LEFT" AS EVIDENCED IN HIS 1972 INDEPENDENCE DAY ADDRESS.

5. SIMILARLY, THE PRESIDENT WAS PROBABLY AS GRATIFIED AS THE GUERRILLAS WERE DISILLUSIONED BY THE VISIBLE LACK OF SUPPORT PROVIDED TO THE LATTER BY THE CAMPESINO CLASS. IF THE GUERRILLAS WERE EXPECTING A MASSIVE FLOCKING TO THEIR BANNER FROM THE RURAL POOR, THEY MUST HAVE BEEN BITTERLY DISAPPOINTED BY THE EVIDENT LACK OF PEASANT SYMPATHY FOR THEIR CAUSE, DEMONSTRATING AGAIN THAT THE DOMINICAN CAMPESINO IS ESSENTIALLY GOBERNISTA, REGARDLESS OF WHO IS IN POWER, AND UNLIKELY, AT PRESENT AT LEAST, TO SUPPORT ANY OUTSIDE-INSPIRED RURAL INSURGENCY MOVEMENT. IN THIS REGARD, THE EMBASSY CAN ONLY SPECULATE ON THE EFFECT OF BALAGUER'S AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM ON THE ATTITUDES OF THE CAMPESINOS IN THE SAN JOSE DE OCOA REGION, ALTHOUGH WE SUSPECT THAT IT WAS PROBABLY MARGINAL.

6. OPPOSITION: THERE WERE IMPORTANT AND SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE AND ACTIONS TOWARD THE EXTREME LEFT, TOWARD THE PRD, AND TOWARD THE OTHER MODERATE OPPOSITION PARTIES IN THE DAYS FOLLOWING THE GUERRILLA LANDING. THE EXTREME LEFT AND, TO A LESSER EXTENT, THE PRD, HAVE BEEN DEALT A SERIOUS POLITICAL SETBACK BY THE VIGOROUS REPRESSIVE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE GODR SINCE THE GUERRILLA LANDING. MANY LEFTIST MILITANTS ARE EITHER UNDER ARREST OR IN HIDING AND THEIR ORGANIZATIONS EVEN MORE IN DISARRAY AND DISPIRITED THAN BEFORE. THE INABILITY OF THE EXTREME LEFT TO MOUNT AN EFFECTIVE CAMPAIGN OF CIVIL DISORDERS OR OTHERWISE TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE INSURGENCY IS ANOTHER SIGN OF ITS CURRENT WEAKNESS VIS- A- VIS THE GOVERNMENT.

7. EVEN THE MASS- BASED, ORGANIZED, AND DISCIPLINED PRD WAS QUICKLY NEUTRALIZED AS ITS TOP LEADERS WERE DRIVEN INTO HIDING  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 SANTO 01722 02 OF 04 191632 Z

AND ITS NATION- WIDE ORGANIZATION DISRUPTED. IN FACT, THE PRD'S PASSIVITY AND FLOUNDERING IN THE FACE OF A DETERMINED BALAGUER ATTACK IS INTERPRETED BY MANY AS A REVELATION OF THE PARTY'S INHERENT WEAKNESS AND ITS INABILITY OR UNWILLINGNESS ( OR BOTH) TO CONFRONT THE GOVERNMENT IN A TEST OF STRENGTH. BOSCH'S DRAMATIC CALL ON MARCH 12 FOR A NEW POLICY OF " AN UNCOMPROMISING STURGGLE" AIMED AT INSTALLING A GOVERNMENT MORE RESPONSIVE TO THE POPULAR WILL HAS THUS FAR NOT YIELDED ANY TANGIBLE RESULTS, REFLECTING THE FACT THAT THE POLICY OPTIONS OPEN TO THE PRD AT THIS STAGE ARE LIMITED. BELEAGUERED AND CONSTANTLY ON THE DEFENSIVE SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE GUERRILLA OPERATION, THE PRD DISPLAYS A SENSE OF UNCERTAINTY, CONFUSION, AND HELPLESSNESS. INDEED, THE PARTY SEEMS TO BE DRIFTING AIMLESSLY, DESPAIRING IN ITS SEARCH FOR A VIABLE PROGRAM WITH WHICH TO BOLSTER ITS OWN MORALE AND JUSTIFY ITS EXISTENCE AS A MAJOR OPPOSITION PARTY. WITH JUAN BOSCH AND JOSE FRANCISCO PENA GOMEZ STILL IN HIDING, THE PRD'S ORGANIZATION, PARTICULARLY IN THE INTERIOR, BADLY SHAKEN, IF NOT ACTUALLY PARALYSED, ITS CONFIDENCE IN ITSELF GREATLY UNDERMINED, AND WITH SERIOUS SPLITS EMERGING WITHIN THE PARTY, THE PRD HAS UNDOUBTEDLY BEEN WEAKENED AND HUMILIATED. NEVERTHELESS, DESPITE ITS CURRENT DEMORALIZED STATE, THERE IS LITTLE HARD EVIDENCE TO INDICATE ANY SIGNIFICANT PRD DEFECTIONS INTO THE GOVERNMENT CAMP AS ALLEGED BY SOME GODR OFFICIALS.

CONFIDENTIAL

ADP000  
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 SANTO 01722 03 OF 04 191603 Z

45  
ACTION ARA-17

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-09 H-02 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-15 USIA-12

ACDA-19 AID-20 IO-12 NIC-01 EUR-25 OMB-01 EB-11

TRSE-00 RSR-01 /174 W  
----- 114445

R 191410 Z APR 73  
FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7939  
INFO CINCSO FOR POLAD  
CINCLANT FOR POLAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 SANTO DOMINGO 1722

8. ALTHOUGH NOT DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY THE GODR' S REPRESSIVE MEASURES TAKEN AGAINST THE EXTREME LEFT AND THR PD, THE OTHER OPPOSITION PARTIES, FEARFUL OF THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF ALIGNING THEMSELVES TOO CLOSELY WITH THE PRD AT THIS JUNCTURE, HAVE ADOPTED A CAUTIOUS WAIT- AND- SEE ATTITUDE WHICH THEY CAN BE EXPECTED TO MAINTAIN UNTIL THE GODR PUBLICLY DEFINES ITS POSITION VIS- A- VIS THE PRD AND ITS TOP LEADERSHIP AND UNTIL THE PRD ITSELF REVEALS ITS NEXT MOVES. IN THE MEANTIME, TALKS AMONG THE OPPOSITION CONTINUE WITHOUT MUCH ENTHUSIASM IN A DESULTORY FASHION, REFLECTING A SENSE OF FRUSTRATION AND UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE FUTURE. WHILE THE MIDA, PQD, AND PRSC SIGNED AN AGREEMENT ON APRIL 13 REGULATING RELATIONS BETWEEN THEMSELVES, ALL REMAIN WARY OF THE " LEFTIST" PRD, PARTICULARLY SINCE IT HAS BEEN OFFICIALLY LINKED WITH THE GUERRILLA INCURSION. NONE- THELESS, THE VERY REALIZATION OF ITS RECENTLY EXPOSED COLLECTIVE WEAKNESS VIS- A- VIS THE GODR HAS SEEMINGLY SERVED TO CONSOLIDATE THE OPPOSITION TO A DEGREE. MANY DOMINICANS, TROUBLED BY THE REPRESSIVE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE GODR, SEEM MORE CONVINCED THAN EVER THAT BALAGUER IS INTENT ON MAINTAINING POWER FOR LIFE AND WOULD NOT HESITATE TO STAMP OUT PERSONAL AND POLITICAL LIBERTIES AND ESTABLISH A DICTATORSHIP IF THESE ACTIONS WERE REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE HIS GOAL. AS A RESULT, THERE HAS BEEN A PERCEPTIBLE TENDENCY TOWARD POLARIZATION OF DOMINICAN POLITICS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SANTO 01722 03 OF 04 191603 Z

AS THE EMERGENCE OF A STRONGER BALAGUER HAS LED TO AN OPPOSITION MORE UNITED THAN EVER, IF ONLY PSYCHOLOGICALLY. WHETHER THIS NEW FOUND SENSE OF UNITY CAN BE TRANSLATED INTO AN EFFECTIVE POLITICAL FORCE TO OPPOSE BALAGUER REMAINS HIGHLY DOUBTFUL, HOWEVER, AS PERSONAL RIVALRIES AND AMBITIONS AND MUTUAL SUSPICION CONTINUE TO PLAGUE THE OPPOSITION CAMP. THE PRD'S UNEXPECTED DECLARATION ON APRIL 5 SEVERING RELATIONS WITH THE MIDA AND PRSC FOR ALLEGED VERBAL SLIGHTS REFLECTS THE FRAGILE NATURE AND ELUSIVENESS OF OPPOSITION UNITY.

9. NORMALIZATION TREND: OPTIMISTIC STATEMENT BY TOP ARMED FORCES LEADERS FOLLOWING HERMANN PEREZ' CAPTURE INDICATED THAT, FOR ALL INTENDS AND PURPOSES, THE ANTI- GUERRILLA ACTIONS HAD LARGELY TERMINATED BY LATE MARCH. THE END OF THE GUERRILLA OPERATION GAVE RISE TO HOPES THAT BALAGUER WOULD BEGIN TO EASE HIS PRESSURE ON THE OPPOSITION AND RELAX HIS STRINGENT EMERGENCY SECURITY MEASURES. FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC, IT WAS SEEMINGLY IN BALAGUER'S INTEREST TO MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE IN HIS REGIME AND REDUCE TENSIONS BUILT UP SINCE THE EARLY FEBRUARY LANDING. PRESUMABLY, THE LARGELY PRD- INSPIRED ANTI- BALAGUER CRITICISM IN THE EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN PRESS AS WELL AS CENSURE IN THE U. S. CONGRESS OF THE GODR'S REPRESSIVE ACTS MAY ALSO HAVE EXERTED SOME INFLUENCE ON BALAGUER TO REDUCE HIS PRESSURE ON THE OPPOSITION.

10. THE GODR TOOK MAJOR STEPS TOWARD RELAXATION OF CURRENT TENSIONS BY A) WITHDRAWING ITS ENCIRCLEMENT OF THE UASD AND RETURNING THAT INSTITUTION TO ITS PROPER AUTHORITIES ON APRIL 3, B) QUITLY SHELVEING, FOR THE MOMENT AT LEAST, THE CONTROVERSIAL LEGISLATIVE BILL DESIGNED TO FURTHER EXTEND OFFICIAL CONTROL OVER THE MEDIA, AND C) DROPPING ALL CHARGES AGAINST TWO TOP PRD LEADERS ACCUSED OF POSSIBLE COLLUSION WITH THE GUERRILLAS. MANY OBSERVERS ARE PREDICTING THAT THE GODR WILL FURTHER RELAX ITS SECURITY MEASURES BY RELASING MOST, IF NOT ALL, POLITICAL PRISONERS ARRESTED DURING THE PAST TWO MONTHS ( ESTIMATED AT APPROXIMATELY 100), EASING ITS RESTRICTIVE MEASURES AGAINST RADIO AND TV STATIONS, AND PERMITTING THE PUBLICATION OF THE LEFT- LEANING NEWSPAPER LA NOTICIA. THE DEGREE TO WHICH BALAGUER WILL IMPLEMENT THE ABOVE PROGRAM WILL UNDOUBTEDLY DEPEND UPON HIS PERCEPTION OF HOW FAST HE CAN MOVE WITHOUT ENDANGERING THE SECURITY OR STABILITY OF HIS REGIME.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 SANTO 01722 03 OF 04 191603 Z

11. NONETHELESS, IF BALAGUER HAD ANY FIRM INTENTIONS OF CONTINUING TO RELAX HIS HOLD OVER THE COUNTRY, THESE PLANS WERE MOMENTARILY THWARTED BY THE MARCH 28 ASSASSINATION OF PROMINENT JOURNALIST GREGORIO GARCIA CASTRO. THE APPARENT INVOLVEMENT IN THIS MURDER OF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL POLICE , ALLEGEDLY AT

THE INSTIGATION OF HIGH RANKING GODR OFFICIALS, IS A POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE DEVELOPMENT WITH FAR- REACHING POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. LIKE SO MANY POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DR, HOWEVER, THE TRUTH SURROUNDING THE SLAYING MAY NEVER BE FULLY KNOWN. GENERAL NEIT NIVAR SEIJAS ATTEMPTED TO TURN GARCIA CASTRO ' S MURDER TO HIS OWN POLITICAL ADVANTAGE BY USING IT TO DISCREDIT POLICE CHIEF GENERAL JOSE ERNESTO CRUZ BREA AND HIS ALLY GENERAL ENRIQUE PEREZ Y PEREZ. IT IS, HOWEVER, DIFFICULT AT THIS TIME TO ASSESS THE FULL SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS DEVELOPMENT OR PREDICT THE OUTCOME OF THE CURRENT POWER PLAY BETWEEN FORCES ALLIED TO THE COUNTRY' S TWO MOST POWERFUL GENERALS.

12. DISPLAYING CONSIDERABLE DYNAMISM DURING HIS FIRST MONTH AS SECRETARY OF THE PRESIDENCY DURING WHIHC HE MOVED VIGOROUSLY

CONFIDENTIAL

ADP000

CONFIDENTIAL POSS DUPE

PAGE 01 SANTO 01722 04 OF 04 191705 Z

45

ACTION ARA-17

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-09 H-02 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-15 USIA-12

ACDA-19 AID-20 IO-12 NIC-01 EUR-25 OMB-01 EB-11

TRSE-00 RSR-01 /174 W

----- 115005

R 191410 Z APR 73

FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7940

INFO CINCSO FOR POLAD

CINCLANT FOR POLAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 4 SANTO DOMINGO 1722

TO EXPAND HIS INFLUENCE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT, GENERAL NIVAR SUFFERED A VIRTUAL ECLIPSE DURING THE ANTI- GUERRILLA OPERATION WHICH SAW THE STAR OF HIS ARCH- RIVAL, GENERAL PEREZ Y PEREZ, RISE. THIS DEVELOPMENT COINCIDED WITH A CONCOMITANT WEAKENDING OF NIVAR' S OWN POSITION AS A RESULT OF THE REMOVAL FROM THEIR JOBS OF SEVERAL OF HIS ALLIES IN THE ARMED FORCES, MOST NOTABLY THAT OF COL. MANUEL LACHAPELLE SUERO WHO WAS REPLACED AS COMMANDER OF THE THIRD BATTALION IN NIVAR' S OWN PROVINCE OF SAN CRISTOBAL, BY AN OFFICER KNOWN TO BE A SUPPORTER OF GENERAL PEREZ Y PEREZ.



MANY ANALYSTS BELIEVE NIVAR MAY BE USING THE GARCIA CASTRO MURDER IN AN ATTEMPT TO REDRESS THE POWER BALANCE IN HIS FAVOR. IN THIS REGARD, NIVAR IN FACT DID SUCCEED IN HAVING POLICE CHIEF CRUZ BREA AS WELL AS THE PRO- PEREZ Y PEREZ SECRET SERVICE CHIEF OUSTED. ALTHOUGH SUCCEEDING IN HAVING HIS OWN MAN NAMED TO DIRECT THE SECRET SERVICE, NIVAR'S PLANS WERE LARGELY THWARTED, HOWEVER, BY THE NAMING ON APRIL 17 OF GENERAL SALVADOR LLUBERES MONTAS - AN ANTI- NIVAR OFFICER - AS POLICE CHIEF.

13. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK: THE RAPIDITY AND EXTENT OF THE GODR MOBILIZATION TO DEFEND ITSELF FROM A PERCEIVED SECURITY THREAT LEFT NO DOUBT THAT BALAGUER TOOK THE GUERRILLA INCURSION SERIOUSLY. THAT THE LANDING OF ONLY NINE ARMED MEN, WITHOUT ANY OVERT REACTION FROM THE LOCAL OPPOSITION, COULD SHAKE THE COUNTRY AND CAUSE A CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SANTO 01722 04 OF 04 191705 Z

MAJOR POLITICAL CRISIS IS A COMPELLING REMINDER OF THE INHERENT FRAGILITY AND INSTABILITY OF DOMINICAN POLITICS. FORTUNATELY, FOR THE GODR, CAAMANO AND HIS COLLEAGUES CHOSE TO ENGAGE IN WHAT NOW SEEMS LIKE PURE ADVENTURISM AT A TIME WHEN DOMINICANS, PARTICULARLY THOSE IN URBAN AREAS, WERE ENJOYING UNPRECEDENTED PROSPERITY AND POLITICAL TRANQUILITY. ALTHOUGH THE EXTENSIVE AND LENGTHY ANTI- GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN WAS OFTEN MARRED BY SERIOUS LOGISTICS PROBLEMS, INEPT LEADERSHIP, AND REPEATED FRUSTRATIONS, THE ULTIMATE ELIMINATION OF THE INSURGENTS IS VIEWED AS A VICTORY FOR THE SECURITY FORCES, SEEMINLY EVEN MORE UNIFIED BEHIND THE REGIME AS A RESULT OF THEIR EFFORTS DURING THE PAST TWO MONTHS. MUCH OF THE GODR'S ENHANCED PRESTIGE RESULTING FROM THE ELIMINATION OF THE GUERRILLAS, HOWEVER, AS DISSIPATED BY THE WIDELY- ALLEGED OFFICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE GARCIA CASTRO MURDER. TIME, ALSO, WILL REVEAL TO WHAT CONCLUSIONS THE EXTREME LEFT AND THE OPPOSITION MAY COME WHEN THEY REFLECT THAT ONLY NINE MEN COULD TIE DOWN AND ELUDE SUCH A LARGE PART OF THE ARMED FORCES FOR ALMOST TWO MONTHS, AS WELL AS THE LONG RANGE EFFECT UPON THE DOMI  
E E E E E E E

\*\*\* Current Handling Restrictions \*\*\* n/a

\*\*\* Current Classification \*\*\* CONFIDENTIAL

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 19 APR 1973  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** garlanwa  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1973SANTO01722  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** RR  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** SANTO DOMINGO  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1973/newtext/t19730451/aaaaiwrf.tel  
**Line Count:** 478  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** ACTION ARA  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 9  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** SD 0216  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** garlanwa  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:** ANOMALY  
**Review Date:** 23 JAN 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <23-Jan-2002 by thigpegh>; APPROVED <14 FEB 2002 by garlanwa>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** <DBA CORRECTED> gwr 980202  
**Subject:** DOMINICAN POLITICAL ASSESSMENT: FIRST QUARTER 1973: THE AFTERMATH OF THE PLAYA CARACOLES GUERRILLA LANDING  
**TAGS:** PINS, DR  
**To:** ARA  
CINCLANT FOR POLAD  
CINCSO FOR POLAD  
SECSTATE WASHDC  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

